Chapter C2 Reforming Legal Language by Durant, Alan & Leung, Janny H.C.
Language and Law 

A resource book for students 
Allan Durant 
and Janny H.C. Leung 
First published 2016 
ISBN: 978-1-138-02558-5 (hbk) 
ISBN: 978-1-138-02557-8 (pbk) 
ISBN: 978-1-315-43625-8 (ebk) 
Chapter C2 





R E F O R M I N G  L E G A L  L A N G U A G E 	  113 C2  
never to use one word where ten will do; never to use a small word where a big one will 
suffice; never to use a simple statement where it appears that one of substantially greater 
complexity will achieve comparable goals; never to use English where Latin, mutatis 
mutandis, will do; and always to qualify virtually everything . . . 
(White 1989: 246) 
Extrapolating from features of style to overall effect, White concludes, ‘If a layperson 
can read a document from beginning to end without falling asleep, it needs work’. What 
point do you think White is making in this concluding comment, given the seriousness 
of legal language in its social effects? 
Finally, compare the two parodies of legal language we have presented. Keep in mind 
that you are engaged in a thought-priming activity here, rather than searching for 
correct answers. Fuller description of legal language varieties is presented elsewhere in 
Thread 1 and in Threads 2 and 3. 
❏	 How far do the two passages point towards similar idiosyncrasies or excesses? 
Do any major differences between the targeted characteristics stand out? 
❏	 The two passages were published over 100 years apart. Is the degree of 
similarity or difference you see between the two passages surprising? 
Activity ✪ 
REFORMING LEGAL LANGUAGE	 C2 
In this unit, we discuss claims and counterclaims that surround proposed reforms of 
legal language. We show why making changes to legal language is difficult by presenting 
a practical task based on an early English statute, and conclude with observations about 
current ‘plain language reform’ proposals. 
Legal language and its critics 
Units A2 and B2 trace the formation of legal English through complicated contact 
between French, Latin and English, and links processes of language change not only to 
political developments, but also to the formation of a community of practice – lawyers 
– who subscribe to a number of principles about their professional language use: 
❏	 standardisation and consistency of documents in the face of contextual variability; 
❏	 resilience of legal documents in the face of challenge by other lawyers involved in 
adversarial proceedings; and 
❏	 decontextualisation in document drafting, so that legal documents can be 
interpreted in different situations arising in later periods (see Butt 2013 for 
discussion of drafting principles based on these linguistic norms). 
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Despite presumed good intentions behind these professional principles, criticisms 
of legal English have been expressed almost throughout the historical period in 
which legal English has been recognised as a variety. In recognition of difficulties sur ­
rounding legal language and response to such criticism, many efforts have been made 
within the legal profession towards reform, including in the UK by the 1975 Renton 
Committee Report on Legislation which was established to achieve ‘greater simplicity 
and clarity in statute law’, as well as by frequent updating of the Civil Procedure Rules 
(CPR), most recently based on Lord Woolf’s recommendations for user-friendly 
language in his Access to Justice report (1996), which replaced expressions such as the 
historical term plaintiff with complainant, inter partes with between parties, Anton 
Pillar order with search order, and pleading with statement of case. From 1979 onwards, 
despite such reforms, the Campaign for Plain English (www.plainenglish.co.uk), with 
parallel organisations in other countries, has tried to bring about more radical rewriting 
of legislation and related documents, not to change what is said but so that whatever 
is said is expressed in an accessible, contemporary style. 
Tensions between ‘change’ and ‘no change’ 
Engaging with issues surrounding reform of legal language, either theoretically or 
practically, calls for more precise formulation of what the problems are. In his brief 
overview of legal English, Crystal (2010: 374) likens critiques of established legal usage 
to criticism of the language of science for its impenetrability and the language of religion 
for its mystique. His view of reform remains a cautious one: 
The goal of a simplified, universally intelligible legal English has an undeniable appeal, 
but it has to be pursued wisely if the results are not to raise more problems than they 
solve. A blanket condemnation of legal language is naive, in that it fails to appreciate what 
such language has to do if it is to function efficiently in the service of the community. 
Equally, there are no grounds for blanket acceptance. 
How justified is this view? There is a tension, Crystal insists, between achieving 
relative accessibility of documents by accommodating to current usage conventions 
(which will then continue to change following any particular reform), and maintaining 
the authority of documents on the questionable basis that they were fixed definitively 
when first produced. That tension lies at the heart of the practical issues we now 
consider. 
Reading a chapter of thirteenth-century English law 
Reform of legal language is felt to be most urgent in how it affects us now. But 
fundamental challenges in rewriting law can be exposed more clearly if we look at a 
historical example. Below, we reproduce Chapter 1 from CHARTA FORESTAE, 
or the ‘Charter of the Forest’ (a charter consisting of 16 such chapters). The charter 
was enacted at Westminster in ‘Anno 9 Henry III and A.D. 1225’, shortly after the 
foundational English legal document Magna Carta (1215, now 800 years old). 
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In primis omnes forefte quas HENRICUS ‘FIRST, We will that all Forefts, which 
EX Avus nofter afforeftavit videantur per King HENRY our Grandfather afforefted, 
bonos & legales homines & fi bofcum fhall be viewed by good and lawful men; 
aliquem alium quam fuum diominicum (2) and if he have made Foreft of any 
afforeftaverit ad dampnum illius cujus other Wood more than of his own 
bofcus ille fuerit deafforeftetur & si bofcum demefne, whereby the Owner of the 
fuum proprium afforeftaverit remaneat Wood have hurt, forthwith it fhall be 
forefta falva communa de herbagio & aliis difafforefted; (3) and if he have made 
in eadem forefta illis qui prius eam habere Foreft of his own Wood, then it fhall 
confueverunt. remain Foreft; (4) faving the Common of 
Herbage, and of other things 
in the fame Forests, to them which before 
were accuftomed to have the fame. 
Your initial reaction to this piece of text will probably be that this source of law 
is antiquated, and possibly impenetrable, and that it cries out for rewriting into 
contemporary English. 
1 List your grounds for this impression (be as precise as you can). 
2 Now rewrite the chapter as well as you can into modern English. 
3 When you have done this, consider the following points: 
3.1	 Among features you are likely to have noticed in rewriting are: 
❏	 the existence of parallel texts (Should you have rewritten the Latin or the 
English version? Which one states the law? Or are both versions state ­
ments of law, which you needed somehow to synthesise if there are 
differences between them?); 
❏	 use of ‘f’ (our simplified font representation) in place of modern ‘s’; 
and 
❏	 capitalisation in the English text of most, but not all, nouns and selective 
use of upper case both for the first word of the chapter and for the name 
of the monarch, King Henry. 
3.2	 You might also have wondered about other features, including: 
❏	 words whose meaning may no longer be clear, such as unusual ‘demefne’ 
and unusual-in-this-context ‘hurt’ (you can find detailed discussion of 
such terms, and the legal concepts they signify, in histories of English law 
such as Pollock and Maitland 1895 or Baker 2002); and 
❏	 coreferring use of ‘the fame’. 
3.3	 Now step back from this venerable/antiquated source of English law that you 
have been working on. Ask yourself: what version of the source text are you 
reading, exactly? 
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In order to work on a facsimile of Charta Foreftae, you have to look 
elsewhere. The version reproduced above comes from: 
Statutes at Large: from MAGNA Charta to the END of the REIGN of KING 
HENRY the SIXTH, To which is prefixed, a TABLE of the TITLES of all the 
Publick and Private Statutes during that Time. VOLUME the FIRST, LONDON 
MDCCLXIX. 
3.4 The edition of the thirteenth-century source of law we are looking at dates, 
then, from 1769 (= MDCCLXIX). It comes from an edition with a brief 
Preface by the editor, Owen Ruffhead, in which he feels obliged to ‘fay 
fomething with regard to the Tranflation’. Reference to ‘translation’ reminds 
us that a thirteenth-century English law would not have been enacted in 
English, but in Latin (see Unit B2). The English version you have just rewritten 
– presuming you didn’t work from the Latin – is not the original, but an 
eighteenth-century modernisation (i.e. you have just rewritten a rewriting). 
3.5 You may conclude that this fact would make an updated, twenty-first-century 
translation all the more urgent, if this piece of legislation on forests and 
forestation continued to be in force. But notice something else in the 
eighteenth-century modernisation: Ruffhead comments in his Preface (using 
the verb form ‘hath’ alongside ‘has’, despite the former having been virtually 
obsolete in general English for nearly a century by the time he was writing) that: 
it has been observed by Mr Serjeant Hawkins, that the old Tranflation hath 
obtained a kind of prefcriptive Authority. 
Ruffhead anticipated criticism of his 1769 update even by comparison with 
earlier renderings (let alone with the original) if he introduced changes into 
the language. His defence of such changes, however, is that although ‘it might 
juftly be deemed Prefumption to alter the old Tranflation’, his purpose is 
exactly to extend access to law by means of the modernisation: ‘the Tranflation 
is intended for the Benefit of thofe who are not qualified to refort to the 
Original’. 
3.6 Ruffhead’s strategy raises an editorial dilemma: 
In the early Statutes, the Errors of the Verfion are exceedingly numerous . . . 
The Reader will perceive frequent, and very material Miftakes. 
And his response to those mistakes is that since the old translation: 
by long Ufe, hath acquired a kind of prefcriptive Authority, it hath been judged 
proper to leave the Text, as it ftands in former Editions, and to infert the 
propofed Amendment in the Margin’. 
3.7 Consider these points together. Even mistakes in a translation that serves as 
a proxy for a legal original have taken on legal authority that needs to be 
preserved. If Ruffhead is to avoid simply reproducing errors that have now 
become ‘authoritative’, he must proliferate legal variants that risk undermining 
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the text’s authority and may create inconsistency of interpretation and 
application. He will also have to add notes that can themselves be challenged, 
and which in any case will add to, rather than decrease, the barrier of legal 
style – and the specialised education necessary to deal with such style – that 
stands between citizen and law. 
❏	 Consider Ruffhead’s editorial dilemma as a hypothetical case study that 
has similarities with, as well as differences from, contemporary challenges 
in rewriting law without changing it. Work through his challenges, as you 
see them, identifying benefits and problems associated with different 
strategies that a modern legal editor (or legislator involved in ‘codifying’, 
or consolidating, previous law) might adopt. 
❏	 Does this activity suggest anything about what consequences might follow 
from adopting a strategy of leaving existing laws as currently written but 
introducing new laws in a more accessible, plainer English style? 
A case for reforming legal language? 
As we saw in a quotation above, Crystal urges caution in advocating wholesale reform 
of legal language. The practical question arises, for instance, whether reforms should 
be applied only to new legislation and related documents, or whether one implication 
of opting for such reforms is a need to review all earlier legal sources (especially as 
these are likely to present the most acute problems of understanding). Given the 
daunting scale of redrafting all earlier legislation, another issue arises: whether, if 
modified legal style is only introduced gradually, inconsistency between legal documents 
dealing with the same matters but written in different periods will be increased. Such 
issues have been extensively discussed, and appear to call for pragmatic responses that 
may vary between different legal settings and purposes. 
READING A STATUTE 
In Unit B3, we have explored how understanding the concept of genre can illuminate 
both the historical development and current functioning of legal text types. In this unit, 
we look at an extract from perhaps the most recognisable legal genre: the statute. 
Statutes state what the law is. But the present division of labour between legal 
professionals and the general public is reflected in the fact that statutes are rarely read 
outside the legal profession. Reading a statute, we show, calls for familiarity with basic 
genre features even in order to find information let alone understand legal import and 
Activity ✪ 
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